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Book Reviews. count, as though we were to contrast the notion of color with the notion of blue. But when we pass from any science to the other subjects, poetry and "knowledge of the world," we pass from realms in which knowledge is supreme, to the worlds of feeling or of practical opinion. The Socrates of Plato's "Apology" shall estimate for us both the poets and the men of the world. "I was conversing with a politician," says Socrates, "and he seemed both to others and to himself to be wise, but in reality he was not." And Socrates anticipated the appeal to the poets such as that which Dr. Illingworth makes. "I noticed," he says, "that because of their poetry they thought that they were the wisest men in other matters also, whereas they were not." Every reader of Plato will recall the discussion in which the distinction between "science" and "opinion" is established. Dr. Illingworth,-to use this old distinction,-is contrasting abstract knowledge not with concrete knowledge, but with mere opinion. For the conclusions which are formed by the poet and the man of the world as such, are after all mere opinion.
Let us consider for a moment what the value of such opinion is likely to be; I do not mean for the practical conduct of affairs, for that is not now in question, but for the study of the subjects with which practical opinion is conversant. So far are affairs from being an adequate training for the intellectual perceptions, that they have a noted tendency to lower the moral standard. That is to say, knowledge which is practical and nothing more, cannot apprehend even practice in its proper or ethical aspect. The disrepute which attaches to the name of Machiavelli, should rather fall upon the statesmen whose methods he analyzed. And although in some directions the moral dangers of practical affairs are lessened nowadays, it is doubtful whether things are really so much better as they seem. For the defects of an age are often those of which it is least conscious. Dean Church in a striking passage, ("Occasional Essays," I, 237), warns "Christian explorers and expounders of truth" against those "entangling and difficult paths of public activity in which it is easy for the thinker, the divine teacher to pass into the religious partisan, the religious manager, contriver and meddler." Dean Church viewed the English religious politics of the sixties and seventies from the inside. There is no reason to think that the beginning of the twentieth century is the dawn of a new era.
Having dealt with the method of Dr. Illingworth's book, let us now turn to the subject matter, the Christian revelation. "The Trinity, the Incarnation and the Church," he says, "together constitute the revelation that God is love" (184 There is another striking inconsistency in Dr. Illingworth's book which may serve as a further warning against the "concrete" method. He defends the Johannine authorship of the "Fourth Gospel," by casting doubts upon the orthodoxy of every one who impugns it (io9).
I am not called upon to discuss this problem, but only the sophistical argument by which Dr. Illingworth would solve it. I will content myself with one remark. Certitude of an intellectual, as distinguished from a moral character, can only be reached by examining and questioning and testing all presuppositions. The charge of heterodoxy has been employed from the first to burke all enquiry and I am surprised that it should be employed in a work which claims to be philosophical in form. If one thing is certain, it is that the argument from tradition taken alone cannot stand. Tradition about the history of the church was questioned in the Magdeburg Centuries and the works of Scaliger and Casaubon. Historical criticism waited two centuries more before it was in a position to deal with the Bible. It has at-Book Reviezus.
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tained probable results with reference to the "Old Testament," results of which Dr. Illingworth takes account when he speaks of the doctrine of the Fall (227).
"The account in Genesis is obviously mythological in form." Yes, obviously, but to whom? To the critic, but not to uninstructed opinion. And this method which has been successively applied to the history of the church, and to the "Old Testament," Dr. Illingworth rejects when he comes to the "Fourth Gospel," by arguments which would have prevented any advance upon the historical conceptions of the middle ages.
I wonder how the "concrete" method affects the case of Cyril of Alexandria? Julian, we are told, would have been unknown to us but for Cyril: "it was the Christian who survived." Yes, as the Alexandrian prince-bishop, "whose Christianity did not succeed in making him just," (Harnack, "History of Dogma," iv, I74), or (to quote a more orthodox writer) in whom "dogmatic interests overpowered all other considerations" (Westcott, St. John xcv).
The absence of references makes it difficult to estimate Dr. Illingworth's indebtedness to Newman's "Grammar of Assent." Newman also has a great deal to say about concrete knowledge and real assent. His whole treatment of the subject however is much more systematic and argumentative than Dr. Illingworth's. Certitude is based by him upon the convergence of many probabilities, not upon the use of presumption drawn from practice.
The student of ethics is concerned, more than at first sight appears, with this "concrete" method. It encourages that prejudice against systematic thought, which is one of the weaknesses of the Anglo-Saxon mind. At any time such a result ought to be deplored, but above all at the present, when every thing is being subordinated to the most immediate and obvious utilities, and when the wider and deeper relations of things are passing out of the common view. The "concrete" method is part of the equipment of the advocate and rhetorician; it has no place among the instruments of disinterested inquiry. 
